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Using the Mortensen and Pissarides model of a labor market with fric-
tions, this paper proposes a new method, simpler than the one presented
in Michaillat (2012), for decomposing unemployment into frictional and
non-frictional (rationing) unemployment for a derived rigid wage-setting
rule. We use it to compute the frictional and non frictional unemploy-
ment rate for two economies characterized by different labor market
institutions, namely the US and the Spanish economy. For the entire
period under study, the US frictional unemployment rate is around 36
per cent of total unemployment, whereas for Spain, approximately 20
per cent of all unemployment is due to frictions. This outcome may be
explained by the fact that Spain is a country with more labor market
rigidities than the US. The empirical results obtained with our method
are also consistent with the main result of Michaillat (2012): in both
countries, non-frictional unemployment increases in recessions.
1 INTRODUCTION
The Great Recession was the most severe recession experienced to date by the
US and the euro area economies in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
and the rise in unemployment. This dramatic increase in unemployment in
recent years has reopened the debate over the causes of unemployment. For
example, Kocherlakota (2010) claims that rising unemployment is associated
with an increase in structural unemployment, while Krugman (2010) explains
that the problem lies in a weak aggregate labor demand, which makes it
Keynesian unemployment. In another theoretical framework, Michaillat
(2012) divides unemployment into frictional and rationing, and measures the
different weight of both components over the business cycle using US data.
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Why is it important to decompose the unemployment rate into its main
components? Breaking down the observed rate of unemployment is vital for
policy makers since it allows them to choose the appropriate policy to apply.
For example, the findings of theoretical and empirical research suggest that
reducing labor mobility costs, providing training programs for developing
worker skills or reducing unemployment benefits all reduce frictional unem-
ployment, whereas fiscal policy does not affect it.
It therefore, necessary to establish the sources of aggregate unemployment
by means of empirical and theoretical analysis, to implement policies that will
reduce the aggregate unemployment rate in the future. This article contributes
to the literature by introducing a new method to disentangle the unemploy-
ment rate into rationing/non-frictional and frictional unemployment.
If one wants to determine frictional and rationing unemployment rates,
one has to introduce frictions in the labor market by a matching function and
a wage-setting rule. However, that also raises the question of how much
employment is due to the wage being set above the competitive wage and how
much is due to matching frictions. To answer this question, the labor market
must be analyzed using the same wage-setting rule and eliminating frictions.
Michaillat (2012) does just that, and shows that with a wage equation
based on the standard surplus sharing rule, if one eliminates frictions and if the
wage is set at the competitive wage rate, then there is no unemployment without
frictions and all the employment obtained when there are frictions is frictional.1
To have non-frictional (rationing) unemployment, the wage-setting rule must
be changed. Michaillant shows that if the wage rule implies rigid wages, in the
presence of diminishing marginal product of labor, there is unemployment
when frictions are eliminated. This means that only part of the unemployment
generated when there are frictions is in fact frictional unemployment. Finally,
he analyzes how frictional and non-frictional unemployment change with this
same wage-setting rule when there are technological shocks.
This paper follows Michaillats procedure, developing some aspects not
addressed in his model. First, he assumes that eliminating frictions means
making the cost of opening a vacancy equal to zero. However, this implies
that the matching frictions in the labor market do not disappear. We take an
alternative approach to that of Michaillat (2012), using a matching function
that eliminates frictions and maintaining a positive cost for opening a
vacancy.2 As in Michaillat (2012), we show that non-frictional unemploy-
ment can also occur with rigid wages and diminishing marginal product of
labor, but the problem of using this wage rule is that it must be deduced. We
1Even with constant or decreasing marginal product of labor.
2For example, Mortensen and Pissarides (2001) show the role played by the cost of recruiting on
the one hand and hiring and training costs on the other. More recently, Brown et al. (2015)
explain that vacancy posting costs are incurred before firms and workers make contact,
whereas the hiring cost is incurred by the firm after contact is made. In this paper, we focus
on the cost of recruiting or vacancy posting cost.
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derive it using the standard union monopoly model in a labor market with
frictions.
The second contribution of this paper is to derive an empirical method
for measuring frictional and rationing unemployment, different to the one
used by Michaillat and also simpler. With this method we decompose the
observed unemployment rate into frictional and non-frictional unemploy-
ment for the US labor market. We do the same for the Spanish economy
because it represents the other extreme of the labor market, characterized as
it is by collective bargaining and higher labor market regulations.
The advantage of following our proposed method, to decompose the
aggregate unemployment rate, is its simplicity. Nevertheless, or results are in
line with Michaillats principal result for both economies. The frictional
unemployment rate is countercyclical and the unemployment rate due to
rationing is procyclical.
With our method, we observe for the US labor market that the average
unemployment rate for the recession years is 7 per cent. Over this period, the
frictional unemployment is about 1.9 per cent and the rationing unemploy-
ment rate is 5.1 per cent. Moreover, as long as unemployment is below 5 per
cent almost all unemployment is frictional. These numbers are roughly con-
sistent with Michaillat s (2012) results. For the entire period, frictional
unemployment is around 36 per cent of total unemployment. Conversely,
the empirical decomposition over the whole period for Spain suggests that
approximately 20 per cent of all unemployment is frictional and the other 80
per cent is rationing unemployment. These results are consistent with a large
body of literature that shows the higher degree of institutional rigidity and
high levels of wage rigidity for the Spanish labor market. Our results mean
that policies that reduce frictional unemployment will contribute more to
the reduction of unemployment in the US than in Spain, where policies of
wage moderation will be more effective for reducing unemployment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
we present a model to determine the amount of frictional and non frictional
employment in a labor market with frictions under a rigid wage equation
that we derive. The third section is devoted to computing the frictional-
rationing unemployment rate for the US and Spain. The fourth section
presents some comments and concluding remarks.
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 Employment in a Labor Market With and Without Frictions Under a
Rigid Wage Equation
In this section, we describe the key features of the labor market matching
framework with frictions and compare it to the equivalent framework with-
out frictions. Using a discrete-time model in a labor market with frictions,
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there is a matching function with constant return to scale hðut; vtÞ < min ðut;
vtÞ where ut is the number of unemployed workers, vt is the number of vacan-
cies and, as usual, labor market tightness is given by ht  vtut. We define the
probability of the firm to filling an open vacancy as qðhÞ  hðu;vÞv , and thus
1
qðhÞ is the mean duration of a vacant job.
3 The probability of an unemployed
worker finding a job is defined as f ðhÞ  hðu;vÞu and, thus 1f ðhÞ is the mean dura-
tion of unemployment. For a large competitive firm, with neoclassical pro-
duction function g(n,a) 5 ana (a< 1), the amount of employment n chosen
by the firm in a labor market with frictions in a stationary equilibrium is





where w is the real wage, c the cost of opening a vacancy, d the discount (real
interest rate) and s the exogenous separation rate.5 We interpret these condi-
tions as meaning that the marginal product of labor is equal to its cost, i.e.
the sum of wage w and the average cost of a vacant job cqðhÞ.
If we assume that the cost of opening a vacancy is proportional to the

















with the elasticity of employment with respect to the wage being constant
and equal to 112a.
To close the model with frictions we assume equilibrium in the labor







where l is an inelastic labor supply and nl the employment rate. Hence, for a given
wage, the equations (1) and (4) determine n and h in a labor market with frictions.
3We omit the time index when it is not necessary.
4We assume that h is constant. See Michaillat (2012) equation (14).
5For the continuous case the condition is @g@n 5aaðnÞ
a21
5w1ðs1dÞ cqðhÞ, see e.g. Cahuc et al. (2014)
equation (9.46) or Pissarides (2000) equation (1.30).
6See Michaillat (2012) equation (3) where he assumes that l51:
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In a labor market without frictions, we assume that hðu; vÞ5min ðu; vÞ;
instead of assuming c50 as Michaillat (2012) does. Now if vu then h1
and hðu; vÞ5min ðu; vÞ5v in which case qðhÞ  hðu;vÞv 51 and, using (2), the
amount of employment chosen by the firm in a labor market without fric-
tions in a steady state nnf is given by the equation:
aaðnnfÞa215 11ð12ð12sÞdÞc½ w (5)






so there is non-frictional or rationing unemployment unf when the wage is




7 Note that in this case employment in a labor market without fric-
tions is given using only the employment equation and then we use the Bev-
eridge curve to get hnf.
8
Finally, if v> u, then h> 1 and hðu; vÞ5min ðu; vÞ5u in which case
f ðhÞ  uu 51 and using the Beveridge curve we obtain nnf 5 l, it means that
there is full employment.
Next, we decompose the aggregate unemployment into two easily inter-
pretable components: non-frictional or rationing unemployment unf and
frictional unemployment uf. We can define the aggregate unemployment as
u5l2n5l2nnf1nnf2n (7)
where, as we said, l – nnf is defined as rationing unemployment and nnf– n is
defined as frictional unemployment, so u 5 unf1 uf. Then frictional unem-
ployment rate is ûf5 ufl .















Following Michaillat (2012) one can show that
7If one assumes that in a labor market without frictions c50, as Michaillat does, nnf is given by
aaðnnf Þa215w.
8Of course it must be true that hnf< 1.
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this implies that, in bad times (when a decreases), frictional unemployment
decreases.













































To empirically decompose the unemployment rate, we need a specific func-
tional form for the matching function. We assume the standard Cobb-
Douglas matching function with constant returns to scale:
hðut; vtÞ5lugt v12gt (11)
where l stands for a scale parameter that captures the aggregate matching
efficiency and g is the elasticity of new hires with respect to unemployment.
The probability of a vacancy being filled is equal to qðhÞ5 hðu;vÞv 5
l
hg and then
















9If, as in Michaillat (2012), we assume that no frictions means c50, then
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which means that, to compute the frictional unemployment rate, we need
data for the exogenous separation rate s, the interest rate to compute the dis-
count factor d, the proportion of the wage for opening a vacancy c, the
parameters of the matching function l and g, the labor share a and, assum-
ing that h and n coincide with the observed data, the observed labor market
tightness and the employment rate n (employment/labor force).
2.2 Comparison with Michaillats Method for Computing the Frictional
Unemployment Rate
Assuming that observed employment coincides with n the amount of non






which one can compute using data for the exogenous separation rate s, the
discount factor d, the proportion of the wage required to open a vacancy c,
the labor share a, the wage w and the technology shock a.11 The difference
between this method (Michaillat-M) and the one described in the previous
section (Garcıa and Sorolla-GS) is that the M method uses data on wages
and technology shocks and the GS method uses basically the parameters of
the matching function l and g and the labor market tightness.12
2.3 How Can We Obtain a Rigid Wage Equation?
To perform the decomposition, it is crucial to have a rigid wage equation
that does not depend on employment ensuring that the wage set is the same,
10Alternatively Michaillat computes n outside the steady state using the dynamic (non-linear)
model, composed of the wage equation, the employment equation [equation (7)] and the
labor market flows equation, using the Fair and Taylor (1983) shooting algorithm.
11This is because Michaillat (2012) c50 computes it using uf 5 waa
 	2 112a2n. In Section A3 of the
online appendix, he computes the a (A3.1), a and w (A3.2), a, w, and l (A3.3), generated by
the employment equation with frictions, the labor market flows equation and the produc-
tion function in the steady state using data for u, h, and production y.
12Moreover, the empirical strategy of this paper differs from Michaillat because our results are
based on the estimation of matching parameters using observed data. Michaillat, on the
other hand, uses the calibration of the parameter and, then simulates frictional and ration-
ing unemployment h.
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independently of whether there are frictions or not. Michaillat (2012) for-
malizes real wage rigidity by employing the following ad hoc wage equation
wt5w Atð Þw;
where 0<w< 1 (estimation w 5 0.7), which appears in Blanchard and Galı
(2010). This wage equation assumes that wages do not depend on employ-
ment and that they partially adjust to technology shocks. In the standard
matching model, it is difficult to derive this wage equation for a number of
reasons. The literature typically assumes individual wage bargaining and as
such that wages and employment are set at the same time, which gives the
generalized bargained wage equation.13 Alternatively, during negotiations
the employment is agreed upon first, followed by the wages, which gives the
Stole and Zwiebel wage equation where again wages depend on employ-
ment.14 Nevertheless, when one assumes collective bargaining there is a
straightforward way to obtain wage rigidity: to assume that wages are set
before employment. One way to model this is to consider that there is a
union in the labor market that acts as a Stackelberg leader, knowing the
employment equation when there are frictions and when there are no fric-
tions. In both cases the union maximizes ðx2b0ÞL; where b0 is the unem-
ployment benefit. This means a collective wage-setting rule, where the union
sets the same wage for all employed workers maximizing the surplus on an
employed worker times the number of employed workers. It is well known
that in this case the wage is a mark up m5 1
121e
, over the unemployment bene-
fit that depends on the elasticity e of the employment function.15 For
example, if the production function is Cobb-Douglas (gðn; aÞ5ana), the elas-
ticity of both LF and LNF is the same and equal to 112a, in which case wF5
wNF5w5
b0
a : Moreover, if one assumes that b05bA
w; that is unemployment
benefits are sensitive to the cycle, then one gets the wage equation proposed
by Blanchard and Galı (2010).
3 EMPIRICAL DECOMPOSITION
In this section, we present the decomposition exercise that enables us to
determine how much of the aggregate unemployment rate is attributable to
either frictional or rationing unemployment. Frictional unemployment is
characterized by the existence of search and matching frictions between
13In these negotiations the wage depends on employment. Specifically, outside the steady state
this wage equation is given in Lemma 1 in Michaillat (2012) but assuming g(n,a) 5 an.
14Outside the steady state this wage equation is given in Lemma 2 in Michaillat (2012) for
g(n,a) 5 ana.
15One may get the same type of wage equation, for individual wage setting. When the firm sets
the wage in an efficient wage environment, the mark up over unemployment benefits
depends on the parameter of the effort function.
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workers and firms in the labor market due to coordination failures and mis-
match between the characteristics of the unemployed workers and require-
ments for vacant jobs, e.g. in terms of skills or geographical location.16 The
second category consists of unemployment due to wage setting above
market-clearing level, in which wages are set by an economic agent (e.g.
firms, workers, or the government). The concept of job rationing due to
wage setting has long been a popular topic in the economic literature.17
We first compute the frictional unemployment rate, ûf using, from the
previous section, expression (13). We then, compute rationing unemploy-
ment as the difference between the observed unemployment rate, û, and fric-
tional rate, i.e.: ûnf5û2ûf . We apply our method for decomposing the
unemployment rate to the US and Spanish labor markets. It should be noted
that this method is very general and may, therefore, be used for any country.
3.1 USA
We begin the analysis by focusing on the US economy using our method
and comparing the results with those reported in Michaillat (2012). We
believe this to be a good test to demonstrate the validity of our method for
decomposing the unemployment rate. We subsequently perform a similar
exercise for the aggregate unemployment rate in Spain.
Table 1 lists the values of the parameters used to decompose the unem-
ployment rate for the US economy.
The analysis covers the period dating from 1980Q1 to 2013Q2. The
data are published by the OECD Main Economic Indicators (MEI) data-
base. More specifically, GDP and labor income data come directly from the
TABLE 1
PARAMETER VALUES, QUARTERLY DATA
Parameter Value Description Source/Target
a 0.67 Share of labor OECD (MEI)
g 0.94 Beveridge elasticity Estimated Value
c 0.12 Vacancy cost Silva and Toledo (2009)
l 1.08 Matching function scale Estimated Value
s 0.07 Separation rate Shimer (2005)
Data,MeanValues
u 6,45% Unemployment OECD (MEI)
1
qðhÞ 0.57 Duration of a vacancy OECD(MEI)
c=q(h) 0.07 Flow cost of recruiting Calculated Value
d 0.986 Discount factor Calculated Value
16For a survey on aggregate matching function studies and microfoundations, see e.g. Petrongolo
and Pissarides (2001) and Stevens (2007).
17Recent research has turned its attention to rigid wages to explain the higher unemployment
rate. See, e.g. Blanchard and Galı (2010) and Michaillat (2012).
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United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis,
while the labor force statistics are provided by the United States Population
& Labor Force US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Our data on unfilled
job vacancies are based on: (i) the number of help-wanted advertisements
published in the classified sections of newspapers and collected by the Con-
ference Board (1980–2000); and (ii) the Job Openings and Labor Turnover
Survey provided by the BLS of the US Department of Labor (2000-
2013Q2).18
To compute the frictional/mismatch unemployment rate ûf, we must
calculate or estimate some parameters. The parameter a is calculated as the
ratio of total compensation of employees over GDP. According to our calcu-
lations, the average labor share is equal to 0.67. Taking the US data on
unemployment and employment, we use Shimer s methodology to calculate
a job separation rate st, that varies for each quarter. We determine an aver-
age of 0.07 per quarter, which is widely used in the literature and consistent
with empirical estimates.19
We obtain the total number of new hires (matches) ht from the expres-
sion ht5nt2nt21ð12sÞ, where n is the employment level and s the separation
rate. Next, we use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to estimate, the aggregate
matching function in the log linear form with non-detrended quarterly data
to obtain an elasticity estimated coefficient g equal to 0.94. This value is in
line with other empirical contributions to this literature (see Section 2 of Pet-
rongolo and Pissarides (2001) for a survey over these issues). After estimat-
ing the parameter g we inferred the aggregate matching efficiency, for each
quarter, using the matching curve relationship implied by equation (11).
This method of computing the aggregate matching efficiency reveals a cycli-
cal pattern in line with empirical evidence (Barnichon and Figura (2011,
2013), Herz and Van Rens (2011)).20
Finally, we set a constant vacancy cost c 5 0.12, which represents a rea-
sonable quarterly value within the range used by other studies.21 Taking into
account this vacancy cost and the rate at which firms contact workers, q(ht),
we compute the expected recruitment cost per worker, c=q(ht), with a plausi-
ble average quarterly value of 0.075. This recruitment cost per worker is in
line with the estimated values obtained in the literature. For instance,
Michaillat (2012) sets a flow cost of recruiting equal to 0.32 per month,
which is approximately equivalent to 0.10 per quarter. Similarly, Shimer
18We combine both series to obtain data for a longer sample period. For an interesting discussion
on these issues see, for instance, Yashiv (2006).
19See, e.g. Shimer (2005), Silva and Toledo (2009) and Michaillat (2012).
20In the literature, the estimated efficiency parameter shows a great dispersion due to different
specifications and variables used to estimate the above mentioned matching function.
21See, e.g. Shimer (2005), Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), Pissarides (2009) and Michaillat
(2012).
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(2005) and Pissarides (2009) choose a cost of approximately 0.15 of a
workers quarterly wage.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the overall unemployment rate and the
frictional unemployment rate in the US.
It is worth stressing three aspects of the results. First and foremost, we
find that in recessions rationing unemployment increases, driving the rise in
total unemployment while frictional unemployment falls. Thus, our empiri-
cal results are consistent with Michaillats (2012) work, despite using a dif-
ferent technique.
Second, the average frictional/mismatch unemployment rate is around
2.3 per cent, while rationing unemployment stands at around 4.1 per cent
over this period, with frictional unemployment thus making up 36 per cent
of total unemployment. More specifically, we observe an average unemploy-
ment rate for the recession years of 7 per cent. Over this period, the frictional
unemployment is about 1.9 per cent and the rationing unemployment rate is
5.1 per cent. It should also be noted that in our empirical decomposition,
based on expression (13), as long as unemployment is below 5 per cent
almost all unemployment is frictional. This result is also similar to the find-
ings of Michaillat (2012) with respect to the US.
Third, rationing unemployment has an important cyclical
component.22
To sum up, we have decomposed of the unemployment rate into fric-
tional and rationing unemployment by means of a more simple technique
than that proposed by Michaillat (2012); nevertheless the results obtained
FIG. 1. Decomposition unemployment rate for US [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
22These results are in line with the work by Abraham and Katz (1986) and Herz and Rens (2011),
among others.
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using our method are consistent with those of his work.23 Our aim is to offer
a complementary method to the one developed by Michaillat to address an
important issue in the business cycle: the decomposition of the unemploy-
ment rate.
Lastly, we check the robustness of the results to: (i) a change in the
vacancy cost c; (ii) a change in the elasticity of employment with respect to
labor demand g; and (iii) a change in the matching function scale l. Recalcu-
lating the decomposition of the unemployment rate we find that, in general,
a higher vacancy cost or a lower elasticity or matching function scale leads
to a rise in frictional/mismatch unemployment.
3.2 Spain
We analyze the situation in Spain since it represents a very different labor
market. We wanted to verify that, with different labor market institutions,
the method of decomposing the unemployment yields the same qualitative
outcomes as those of Michaillat (2012): namely, that frictional unemploy-
ment is clearly anticyclical, rationing unemployment is procyclical and at
times of high economic expansion all unemployment is frictional. We also
want to know the mean decomposition of unemployment for the entire
period.
Table 2 presents the parameter values used to decompose the unem-
ployment rate for Spain. The methodology used to obtain the parameters
(a,g,l,s) is the same as that used for the US.
We employ quarterly data covering the period 1980 to 2013Q2. The
data on the variables that we use (the unemployment rate, the vacancy rate,
etc.) were obtained from two sources. The number of vacancies per quarter
is provided by the REMSDB macroeconomic database compiled to simulate
TABLE 2
PARAMETER VALUES, QUARTERLY DATA
Parameter Value Description Source/Target
a 0.66 Share of labor Data BDREMS/INE
g 0.87 Beveridge elasticity Estimated Value
c 0.12 Vacancy cost Michaillat (2012)
l 0.7 Matching function scale Estimated Value
s 0.1 Separation rate Shimer (2005)
Data,MeanValues
u 17% Unemployment Data BDREMS/INE
1
qðhÞ 0.59 Duration of a vacancy Data BDREMS/INE
c=q(h) 0.08 Flow cost of recruiting Data BDREMS/INE
d 0.98 Discount factor Calculated Value
23It is important to point out that we also assume an alternative approach using a matching func-
tion that eliminates frictions and maintains a positive cost for opening a vacancy.
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and calibrate the Rational Expectations Model (REMS) for the Spanish
economy. The rest of the data comes from the Spanish Quarterly National
Accounts (SQNA) and the Encuesta de Poblacion Activa (Labor Force Sur-
vey) provided by the Instituto Nacional de Estadıstica (INE; National Sta-
tistical Institute).
It is important to point out that the estimated coefficient u50:87 is
consistent with the range of values estimated in other more extensive studies
of the Spanish labor market.24
We set the value of the vacancy posting cost to c 5 3 per cent of annual
labor costs per worker.25 This value is in line with the calibration by Sala
and Silva (2009), who find that the hiring cost of new hired workers repre-
sents 2 per cent of the annual wage. However, other studies focusing on the
Spanish labor market estimate a unit hiring cost of between 10 per cent and
16 per cent of the gross annual wage of a permanent worker (see, for
instance, Alonso-Borrego et al. (2006)). More recently, Aguirregabiria and
Alonso Borrego (2009) estimated hiring costs for temporary and permanent
workers using a panel of 2356 Spanish manufacturing firms. They found
that hiring costs are similar and that values range from 10 per cent to 18 per
cent of workers annual salaries. We take the most conservative of these sce-
narios and set this cost at 3 per cent, since we assume that it reflects the time
and money involved in the screening process for opening a vacancy.
Figure 2 displays the observed unemployment rate in the Spanish labor
market over the period under study, and the decomposition between fric-
tional and rationing unemployment; the pattern highlights several points of
interest.
FIG. 2. Decomposition unemployment rate for Spain [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
24See e.g. Burda and Wyplosz (1994), Peracchi and Viviano (2004) and Alvarez de Toledo (2007).
25If we increase the value of this parameter, we obtain a higher frictional unemployment rate.
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First, the unemployment rate in Spain is characterized by a larger sam-
ple mean than the US economy. In fact, a permanent feature of the Spanish
economy is both the high level and the persistence of unemployment along
the sample considered. More specifically, the average unemployment rate
from 1980 to 2013 is 17 per cent, reaching an all-time high of 20 per cent in
the periods of lower growth (1983–1988, 1992–1998 and 2010–2013) and a
record low of 7.9 per cent in the second quarter of 2007, characterized by
strong economic growth.
Second, the average frictional/mismatch unemployment rate is around
3.4 per cent, while rationing unemployment stands at around 13.6 per cent
over the entire sample. These results are consistent with numerous studies
that show the higher degree of institutional rigidity (employment protection
regulation, unions and collective bargaining) and high levels of wage rigidity
in European countries.26
Third, it is worth stressing that the estimated level of rationing unem-
ployment registers a markedly procyclical pattern over the entire period
under study, while the frictional unemployment is countercyclical, as in the
US case. Finally, it should also be noted that, in our empirical decomposi-
tion, when the unemployment rate is below 10 per cent almost all unemploy-
ment is frictional.
We also analyze the robustness of the decomposition of the unemploy-
ment rate to changes in the parameters c, l, and g. The changes in the rate
of frictional/mismatch unemployment are in line whith those analyzed in the
US case.
4 CONCLUSIONS
This paper uses a new accounting technique to differentiate between fric-
tional and rationing unemployment with a derived rigid wage-setting rule
over the business cycle. Our paper follows Michaillats (2012) approach,
developing some aspects not addressed in his model. Michaillats work
assumes that eliminating frictions means making the cost of opening a
vacancy equal to zero but not changing the matching friction, which implies
that frictions in the labor market do not disappear. We take a different
approach from Michaillat (2012), using a matching function that eliminates
frictions and maintaining a positive cost for opening a vacancy. In terms of
empirical methodology, our unemployment rate decomposition technique
basically requires the estimation of matching parameters and observed labor
market data while Michaillat calibrates the parameters and estimates pro-
ductivity and wages. However, it is important to point out that the results
yielded using our method are in line with the Michaillats principal result:
the frictional unemployment is countercyclical and the unemployment due
26See Blanchard et al. (1995), or more recently Jimeno and Thomas (2013).
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to rationing is procyclical. To be able to compare our technique with
Michaillats work, we use data from the US labor market, and we have addi-
tionally chosen data from the Spanish labor market to corroborate the
robustness of our method and to see the differences between a flexible (US)
and a rigid (Spain) labor market
With our method, we observe for the US labor market that the average
unemployment rate for the recession years is 7 per cent. Over this period, the
frictional unemployment is about 1.9 per cent and the rationing unemployment
rate is 5.1 per cent. Moreover, as long as unemployment is below 5 per cent
almost all unemployment is frictional. These numbers are roughly consistent
with Michaillats (2012) results. We also observe that over the entire period
frictional unemployment accounts for 36 per cent of total unemployment.
For Spain, the decomposition of unemployment rate also follows
Michaillats patterns and we find that approximately 20 per cent of all unem-
ployment is due to frictions in the labor market with the other 80 per cent
due to job rationing problems. These results are consistent with a large body
of literature for the Spanish labor market that shows the higher degree of
institutional and wage rigidity. The analysis suggests that labor market poli-
cies targeted at reducing frictional unemployment will have more success in
the US than in Spain for reducing unemployment.
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